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Today quotas only apply to third-
country nationals1 who want to find 
employment in Switzerland and to 
some service providers from Euro-
pean Union (EU) Member States or 
countries signatory to the European 
Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).2 
According to the official statistics, 
only 4.1% of long-term immigrants 
to Switzerland in 2015 were subject 
to quotas. That corresponds to 6,140 
persons.3 
After the vote on mass migration in 
February 2014, quotas have returned 
to the center of public debates on 
immigration. The initiative, which 
was supported by 50.3% of voters, 
requested the reintroduction of 
quotas for all categories of foreigners 
and puts Switzerland in a delicate 
position, in particular with regard to 
the EU. Introducing quotas for Euro-
peans is difficult to make compatible 
with the principle of the free move-
ment of persons, which underlies 
agreements between Switzerland 
and the EU.
In this paper, I describe and ana-
lyze some of the mechanisms of the 
current quota system based on a 
combination of document analysis 
and interviews conducted between 
2014 and 2016 with cantonal officials 
in charge of admitting non-EU/EFTA 
nationals seeking employment in 
Switzerland.4 I argue that: 
“Quotas are not only governing 
tools, they are also political sig-
nals to the population and indica-
tors of power relations between 
governing actors.”
Swiss Admission System for 
Foreign Workers
According to the Swiss government, 
only “qualified workers from third 
countries who are absolutely need-
ed” are allowed to enter the Swiss 
labor market.5 This fundamental 
principle applies to all foreign work-
ers who are not nationals of EU or 
EFTA Member States. Moreover, the 
Swiss admission system for third-
country workers is demand driven: 
employers must first request to hire 
a foreigner and prove they could not 
find someone in Switzerland or the 
EU. This restrictive admission policy 
contrasts with the free movement of 
citizens in EU/EFTA Member States. 
Cantons are responsible for apply-
ing the laws that have been defined 
by the federal government. They are 
thus in charge of processing admis-
sion requests. In the case of permits 
for non-EU/EFTA workers, however, 
the State Secretariat for Migration 
must validate the decisions of the 
cantonal authorities. This restricts 
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the cantonal authorities’ flexibility in 
interpreting the federal law.
The admission of non-EU/EFTA 
workers and some service provid-
ers from the EU is regulated on both 
the cantonal and federal levels with 
a quota system. At the beginning 
of each year, the Swiss government 
publishes the maximum quantity 
of permits that can be allocated to 
these categories of foreigners. The 
numbers are different for residence 
(B) and short-term (L) permits. For 
instance, in 2015, a maximum of 
4,000 short-term permits (L) and 
2,500 residence permits (B) could be 
allocated to non-EU/EFTA work-
ers, and a maximum of 2,000 short-
term permits (L) and 250 residence 
permits (B) could be allocated to EU/
EFTA service providers assigned to 
Switzerland for more than 90 days.6 
A further distinction exists between 
cantonal quotas and federal quo-
tas for non-EU/EFTA workers: each 
canton is allocated a certain num-
ber of permits based on its size and 
needs; but a reserve of permits is also 
kept at the federal level for cantons 
that have exhausted their quotas. 
Cantonal authorities who apply for 
additional permits from this federal 
quota need to justify their request 
to the federal authorities, who then 
make a decision on a case-by-case 
basis. The federal quota consists of 
2,000 L permits and 1,250 B permits, 
meaning that the total number of 
permits for non-EU/EFTA workers is 
cut in half between the cantonal and 
federal level.
Case Studies in the Cantons of 
Basel-City and Vaud
An example shows how this quota 
system is implemented in practice. 
Basel-City and Vaud are among the 
cantons that receive the most per-
mits for non-EU/EFTA immigrants. 
This is mainly due to the nature of 
their economic activity since both 
cantons are host to multi-national 
companies such as Novartis, Roche, 
and Syngenta in Basel-City, and 
Nestlé, Philip Morris, and Medtronic 
in Vaud. Local authorities are aware 
of the economic importance of these 
companies and try to maintain good 
relationships with them. In an inter-
view, an employee of the department 
in charge of controlling foreigners’ 
access to the labor market in Basel-
City explained that it is important to 
them “that the big companies stay 
here, and that they can provide their 
services, and that they also obtain 
the workforce they want.”7 
The official maximum number of 
permits allocated to Vaud and Basel-
City are relatively high compared 
to other Swiss cantons. In 2015, the 
canton of Vaud was allocated 158 
short-term permits and 98 residence 
permits, which positions it just after 
Zurich and Bern in terms of quota 
number. Basel-City has the ninth 
largest quota out of 26 cantons, 
Quotas
nccr – on the move, highlights #1 / November 2016 41/51
The Symbolic Value of Quotas in  
the Swiss Immigration System
Figure 1: Cantonal Quotas for Non-EU/EFTA Workers and Population Size by Canton 
(Year 2015) 
	
Swiss	
Canton	
Max.	number	of	
short-term	
permits	(L)	
Max.	number	
of	residence	
permits	(B)	
Permanent	
resident	
population	(in	
thousands)i	
Zurich	 403	 252	 1466.4	
Bern	 252	 157	 1017.5	
Vaud	 158	 98	 773.4	
Aargau	 136	 85	 653.7	
St.	Gallen	 121	 76	 499.1	
Geneva	 133	 83	 484.7	
Lucerne	 88	 55	 398.8	
Ticino	 91	 57	 351.9	
Valais	 65	 40	 335.7	
Fribourg	 52	 32	 307.5	
Basel-
Landschaft	 63	 39	 283.2	
Thurgau	 52	 32	 267.4	
Solothurn	 59	 37	 266.4	
Graubünden	 51	 32	 196.6	
Basel-City	 84	 52	 191.8	
Neuchâtel	 45	 28	 178.1	
Schwyz	 28	 18	 154.1	
Zug	 36	 23	 122.1	
Schaffhausen	 19	 12	 79.8	
Jura	 17	 11	 72.8	
Appenzell	
Ausserrhoden	 11	 7	 54.5	
Nidwalden	 9	 6	 42.4	
Glarus	 9	 6	 40	
Obwalden	 7	 5	 37.1	
Uri	 8	 5	 36	
Appenzell	
Innerrhoden	 3	 2	 16	
TOTAL	 2,000	 1,250	 8,327.1	
	
	
																																								 																				
i Reference: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/raeumliche_verteilung/kantone__gemeind
en.html. 
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with 84 short-term and 52 residence 
permits, which is comparatively 
high given that Basel-City is only the 
fifteenth most populous canton.
These numbers become more inter-
esting when one knows that in 2015 
Basel-City already exhausted its 
cantonal quota of permits in March. 
Similarly, in Vaud the cantonal office 
in charge of admitting non-EU/EFTA 
workers grants on average 500 to 600 
residence permits per year – more 
than five times higher than the can-
tonal quota. This means that in both 
Vaud and Basel-City, the cantonal 
quota covers only a very small share 
of their permit needs while the fed-
eral quota covers the main share.
Understanding the Logic of the 
System
In this context, it is legitimate to ask 
why such a large difference exists 
between the officially allocated num-
bers and the actually granted per-
mits, especially since the number of 
permits granted each year appears to 
be relatively stable according to the 
interviewed cantonal administrators. 
It appears that the number of permits 
allocated to each canton is not only 
based on practical needs: if cantons 
such as Basel-City or Vaud regularly 
receive four to six times more permits 
than what is officially allocated to 
them based on the cantonal quotas, 
then other reasons must explain why 
cantonal quotas are set so low. I pro-
pose three possible interpretations of 
this phenomenon.
First, keeping the numbers of can-
tonal quotas low may help avoid the 
criticism that the distribution of 
permits is too unequal between the 
cantons.
“In a context where admission 
numbers are restricted, cantons 
compete with one another for 
permits.”
In that sense, the quotas officially 
allocated to the cantons and the dis-
tribution of the federal quota reflect 
two different logics. The cantonal 
quota is mainly symbolic and rep-
resents a fair distribution of permits 
among the cantons. The practice of 
resorting to the federal quota follows 
a more pragmatic approach based on 
the actual demands of the different 
cantons.
Second, the interplay between the 
relatively low cantonal quotas and 
the important federal quota may 
serve as a tool for the federal gov-
ernment to better control cantonal 
practices of issuing permits and 
to ensure a degree of flexibility in 
case of unexpected changes. Sev-
eral criteria regulate the admission 
of non-EU/EFTA workers,8 but the 
most important principle is that “the 
admission of gainfully employed 
foreign nationals is allowed in the 
interests of the economy as a whole” 
(art. 3). What constitutes an econom-
ic interest varies, however, over time 
and between cantons.9 
“In that sense, the distinction be-
tween cantonal and federal quotas 
constitutes a compromise be-
tween recognizing cantonal spec-
ificities and retaining the federal 
government’s ability to enforce its 
priorities with regard to economic 
and migration policy.” 
Finally, quotas may be used to signal 
political intentions to the popula-
tion. This symbolic function of quo-
tas became particularly apparent, for 
instance, in November 2014, shortly 
after the acceptance of the popular 
initiative against mass immigra-
tion, when the Swiss Federal Council 
decided to reduce the maximum 
number of permits available for 
non-EU/EFTA workers and service 
providers from EU/EFTA countries in 
2015 by 3,250 permits.10  This deci-
sion was not required from a legal 
perspective since – at that point – no 
legislative change had been intro-
duced. Yet the reduction clearly was 
the government’s response to the 
popular demand for more immigra-
tion control. In practice, however, 
the quota reduction did not lead to 
a clear decrease in admitted work-
ers.11 In fact, the reduced quota of 
residence permits for non-EU/EFTA 
workers in 2015 was exhausted before 
the end of the year, which was solved 
by resorting to remaining quotas 
from the previous year.12 
“Thus, parallel to the political 
decision to reduce quotas, admin-
istrative solutions were found to 
satisfy employers’ actual needs for 
permits.”
This case study shows that quotas 
are not only controlling tools, they 
also serve as signals of the govern-
ment’s power. By providing an 
impression of measurability and 
control, quotas strengthen the public 
perception that the Swiss govern-
ment is in charge of its migration 
management. In practice, however, 
quotas are difficult to administer be-
cause they lack flexibility and require 
a lot of bureaucracy.13 
The Limits of State Sovereignty
The current Swiss quota system 
exemplifies the paradoxes of migra-
tion management. On the one hand, 
an important dimension of state 
sovereignty necessitates that states 
have the ability to control the admis-
sion and residence of foreigners in a 
given territory. On the other hand, 
performing this task is becoming 
increasingly difficult in a context in 
which immigration is largely driven 
by the economy and in which local 
governments have significant power, 
as in Switzerland. Moreover, the 
development of supranational regu-
lations, such as the free movement 
of persons within the EU and EFTA, 
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and the enforcement of human rights 
further restrict the power of states 
to control the entry and residence of 
foreigners in their territories. 
“The Swiss government has 
extremely limited possibilities 
for reducing immigration without 
inhibiting its economic dynamism, 
its internal cohesion, its bilateral 
relations, or its moral legitimacy.”
In the current Swiss immigration 
system, non-EU/EFTA workers are 
one of the few categories of people 
that the government has full author-
ity to accept or refuse admission to. 
But this category corresponds to 
a very small share of all the immi-
grants entering Switzerland (about 
4%). Reducing the number further 
would directly affect the interests of 
major economic actors who want to 
be able to attract specialists from all 
over the world. 
One of the main goals of the initia-
tive against mass immigration was 
to extend the use of quotas to all cat-
egories of immigrants, enabling the 
Swiss government to regain a better 
control over its borders. In practice, 
however, what is at stake is not so 
much winning back state sovereign-
ty, but rather a series of compromises 
between various local, national, and 
international interests.
Since the 1990s, both globaliza-
tion and European integration have 
encouraged many Swiss institutions 
to internationalize their strategies.14 
Cooperation between states has in-
creased in importance and economic 
actors have also become more com-
petitive at the international level. 
This state of affairs is difficult to 
reconcile with a strict quota system 
that would jeopardize the interests 
of the main economic actors and – by 
extension – the regions that largely 
depend on these actors. 
“A strict quota system would also 
be incompatible with the Agree-
ment on the Free Movement of 
Persons between Switzerland and 
the EU, and would therefore force 
the Swiss government to renego-
tiate the advantages associated 
with it.” 
Finally, a strict quota system would 
challenge a number of humanitarian 
principles that the Swiss government 
has to respect in order to maintain its 
legitimacy.
In this context, the Swiss govern-
ment is left with little choice but to 
find a compromise that will both 
satisfy a sufficient number of voters, 
who requested more control over 
immigration on 9 February 2014, 
and also protect the economic and 
political interests at stake. The solu-
tion recently adopted by the Na-
tional Council – which consists in a 
safeguard clause and a “light” system 
of national preference – constitutes 
such a compromise, even though its 
compatibility with both the Agree-
ment on the Free Movement of 
Persons and the new constitutional 
article approved by the vote against 
mass immigration is questionable.15 
The perfect solution has not yet 
been found, and there is still much 
room for debate and negotiation. But 
given the complexity of the current 
situation, I anticipate that the solu-
tion will in any case require enough 
flexibility for local authorities to 
adapt the new policy to their practi-
cal needs. 
1 In Switzerland, third countries are
 countries that do not belong to the 
European Union (EU) or the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA).
2 See art. 19a and 20a of the Verordnung 
über Zulassung, Aufenthalt und 
Erwerbstätigkeit (VZAE).
3 SEM, 2016.
4 I conducted the research used in this 
article with Metka Hercog for the project 
“The Mobility of the Highly Skilled 
towards Switzerland”, which is part of 
the nccr – on the move and is funded by 
the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
We have composed a more detailed 
paper based on this research; it will be 
published under the title “Selecting the 
Highly Skilled: Norms and Practices in 
the Swiss Admission Regime for Non-EU 
Immigrants”.
5 Swiss Federal Council, 2002, p. 3473.
6 See the VZAE appendixes 1 and 2.
7 Q: “Was sind die Prioritäten, die Ihre 
Arbeit beeinflussen?” A: “Jetzt also halt, 
dass die großen Firmen hier bleiben und 
dass die ihre Dienstleistungen erbringen 
können und dass sie die nötigen 
Fachkräfte auch bekommen, die sie 
möchten.”
8 See art. 18-26 of the Federal Act on 
Foreign Nationals.
9 Afonso, 2004; Amarelle and Nguyen, 
2010; Piguet, 2006.
10 The total number of quotas available in 
2014 was 12,000, compared to 8,750 in 
2015.
11 Statistics of the State Secretariat for 
Migration indicate that in 2014, 5,827 
workers were admitted through the 
quota system and 68,953 were admitted 
independently of the quota system. In 
2015, these numbers were 6,140 and 
64,843 respectively.
12 This is indicated in a footnote on page 
13 of the 2015 SEM report on immigra-
tion statistics: “Vollständige Ausschöp-
fung; der über die Höchstzahl (2 500) 
hinausgehende Bedarf hat der Bund mit 
Kontingenten aus der Vorjahresreserve 
gedeckt.” [My translation: “Complete ex-
haustion: the Confederation has covered 
the demand that exceeds the maximum 
number (2,500) with quotas from last 
year’s reserve.”]
13 For an analysis of the previous Swiss 
quota system, see Cattacin, 1987; Dhima, 
1991.
14 Afonso, 2004; Mach et al., 2011; Piguet, 
2006, 2009.
15 Boillet, 2016.
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Zusammenfassung
Der symbolische Wert von Quoten im  
Schweizer Einwanderungssystem
Die Annahme der Volksinitiative gegen Masseneinwan-
derung hat die Frage der Einwanderungskontingente 
erneut in den Fokus der öffentlichen Debatte gerückt. Der 
vorliegende Artikel setzt sich mit diesem Thema auseinan-
der und analysiert das Kontingentsystem, das gegenwärtig 
auf Menschen aus Drittstaaten, die in der Schweiz arbei-
ten möchten, angewandt wird. Obwohl nur sehr wenige 
Einwanderinnen und Einwanderer von diesem System 
betroffen sind, wirft es mehrere Fragen auf: einerseits zu 
den Instrumenten, über welche die Schweiz zur Kontrolle 
der Immigration verfügt, und andererseits zu den Umset-
zungsmöglichkeiten der Initiative. Im Artikel wird argu-
mentiert, dass Kontingente im aktuellen System vor allem 
eine symbolische Funktion im Sinne eines politischen 
Zeichens an die Bevölkerung haben. In der Praxis sind 
diese Kontingente allerdings schwierig durchsetzbar und 
erfordern im Spannungsfeld zwischen Theorie und Praxis 
nicht selten ein gewisses Mass an Flexibilität. Obwohl 
die Initiative vom 9. Februar 2014 die Wiedereinführung 
von Kontingenten für alle Kategorien von Ausländerin-
nen und Ausländern fordert, die in der Schweiz leben 
möchten, kann sie gegenwärtig nicht strikte angewandt 
werden, ohne sich nachteilig auf mehrere Hauptinteressen 
des Landes auszuwirken. Die aktuelle Herausforderung 
besteht deshalb darin, einen Kompromiss zu finden, der 
auf der einen Seite diejenigen Wählerinnen und Wähler 
beruhigt, die bei der Immigration verschärfte Kontrollen 
fordern, und auf der anderen Seite genügend flexibel ist, 
um die auf dem Spiel stehenden Interessen zu wahren.
Résumé
La valeur symbolique des contingents  
d’immigration dans le système suisse
L’approbation de l’initiative populaire contre l’immigra-
tion de masse a replacé le thème des contingents d’im-
migration au centre du débat public. Le présent article 
se penche sur cette question en analysant le système de 
contingents actuellement appliqué aux ressortissant·e·s 
d’états tiers souhaitant venir travailler en Suisse. Bien 
que ce système ne concerne qu’une très faible proportion 
d’immigré·e·s, il soulève plusieurs questions concernant 
les outils dont dispose l’Etat suisse pour contrôler son 
immigration et les possibles applications de l’initia-
tive. L’article argumente que, dans le système actuel, les 
contingents jouent un rôle avant tout symbolique de signal 
politique à la population. En pratique, ils sont cependant 
difficiles à administrer et nécessitent souvent une marge 
de flexibilité entre théorie et pratique. Bien que l’initiative 
du 9 février 2014 demande un retour des contingents pour 
toutes les catégories d’étrangers souhaitant séjourner en 
Suisse, cette initiative ne peut actuellement être appli-
quée de manière stricte sans péjorer plusieurs intérêts 
nationaux majeurs. L’enjeu actuel est donc la recherche 
d’un compromis qui, d’un côté, rassure les électeur·trice·s 
souhaitant d’avantage de contrôle sur l’immigration et, 
d’autre part, soit suffisamment flexible pour préserver les 
intérêts en jeu. 
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